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We are delighted to have the opportunity to respond to Martha Nussbaum’s 
excellent Creating Capabilities. In that book Nussbaum pays us the great 
compliment of discussing some aspects of our own book Disadvantage (Wolff 
and de-Shalit, 2007), both endorsing some of our analysis, yet also entering some 
criticisms. We would like here to explain the issues and provide our response. 
 
The ideas that Nussbaum endorses, albeit with qualifications, from our work are 
essentially three. The first is the idea of ‘secure functionings’, re-named by 
Nussbaum ‘capability security’ (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 43): that it is important to 
people not only that they enjoy a certain level of functioning but also that they 
are able to sustain it over time. Furthermore, it is important to people to be free 
from the worry, which people whose functioning is at an ongoing risk, 
experience. The second is that of ‘corrosive disadvantage’, where a disadvantage 
in one domain is likely to spread its effects to other areas. Drug addiction, 
homelessness1, or possibly uncontrollable debt are examples of corrosive 
disadvantages. The third is ‘fertile functioning’ where an achievement in one 
area is likely to have benefits elsewhere. Self-control is increasingly being argued 
to be a fertile functioning in this sense, while we speculated that ‘affiliation’ and 
‘having friends’ in the sense of having a supportive social network would also be 
fertile. We also, quite naturally, suggest that it should be a priority for public 
policy to take preventative steps to block the formation of corrosive 
disadvantages, and to build fertile functionings. 
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Parenthetically, although it will play no further part in this discussion we would 
also like to introduce an additional idea that is implicit in our previous analysis, 
that of ‘multiple, severe disadvantage’. This is the idea of being in a badly 
disadvantaged situation, but the available opportunities to improve your 
situation puts you at grave risk of becoming worse off still; for example someone 
who can only obtain very dangerous work, or, perhaps, can only feed themselves 
by breaking the law.  Such people are more or less stuck in a disadvantaged 
position unless something can be done to break the structural impediments they 
face. 
 
We should make clear that while the concepts we use are novel, they are, 
perhaps, implicit in much social science, and one could claim that they are indeed 
derived from the capability approach. So our hope is that these concepts can be 
easily incorporated into philosophical and empirical analysis. 
 
It is one of the names, however, that Nussbaum initially objects to, and this leads 
to more substantial philosophical issues. Nussbaum is not happy with the idea of 
‘fertile functionings’ suggesting that our liking for alliteration has stood in the 
way of clear thought (p. 44). We should, she feels, have talked about ‘fertile 
capabilities’ and more generally suggests that we are unclear in whether our 
analysis focuses on capabilities or functionings. Well, we must concede a 
weakness for alliteration, but nevertheless in this case we feel it aids, rather than 
impedes, clear analysis. 
 
The issue is this. Let us use the neutral term ‘fertile advantages’, and ask whether 
further advantages will come from having a capability or from a functioning. 
Which would it be? Before settling this issue we should note that in Disadvantage 
we expressed at least three concerns about the notion of capability which 
stopped us from endorsing it whole-heartedly in our analysis. 
 
One problem is the question of the ‘gap’ between capabilities and functionings. 
That is, when do I have a capability for affiliation, for example? Suppose I move 
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on my own to a new town, but there are many opportunities for meeting new 
people. There is a community centre, evening classes, hobby clubs, political 
meetings, support groups, and so on. But I haven’t done anything to take 
advantage of these opportunities and I spend my free time alone. Do I have the 
capability for affiliation or not? I do in the sense that I could achieve it if I chose, 
and worked at it for a while. Or suppose I live in a town where there are none of 
these things, but I could easily move to the town with the facilities just 
mentioned . Do I still have the capability? Or on the contrary do we want to say 
that actually I only have the capability when I do in fact have a social network? If 
so then the distinction between capability and functioning appears to have 
collapsed (more on this shortly). If we deny this identification then we need to 
say at what point the opportunity is too remote to constitute a capability. The 
more remote, the less valuable an unrealised capability; the less remote the less 
we can insist on a clear distinction. 
 
The second problem is that the two notions together are rather confusing: it is 
not always really clear when something is a capability and when it is a 
functioning. Many functionings are in fact capabilities for other functionings. For 
example, literacy is a capability and reading is a functioning. But reading is not 
only a functioning; it is, at the same time, a capability, e.g. for studying, or for 
driving. As David A. Clark argues (2005, 1361), many functionings, from 
recreational activities, through spiritual activities to psychological achievements 
also represent necessary inputs for good living, and therefore for other 
functionings. 
 
The  third problem is epistemological. Functionings can be observed, capabilities 
cannot or at least not so easily, and this will create severe difficulties for policy. 
This at least provides a pragmatic reason for focusing on functionings. Once 
more we are very far from being the first authors to point this out, but we 
mention it here just to record the reservations that prevent us from adopting the 
capability approach in unqualified form. 
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However, there are further philosophical concerns that lay under our difficulties 
with the idea of a capability that we did not articulate earlier and now make us 
think that the terrain is even more complex than we have realised. If someone 
has a realised capability then what exactly do they have? We believe that in the 
paradigm case there will be at least three things we can say: 
 
i) They have achieved the functioning. 
ii) They have had the choice whether or not to have achieved the 
functioning. (Freedom whether to achieve.) 
iii) They have achieved the functioning in their own way. (Freedom how 
to achieve.) 
 
The second and third of these are clearly forms of freedom, and we feel that they 
could be easily confused, at some cost. Consider, for example, the realised 
capability for bodily health. Someone who has this capability will be healthy 
(feature i) and probably have done so at least in part by taking control over their 
own health (feature iii). Martha Nussbaum says that the capabilities approach 
‘commits itself to respect for people’s powers of self-definition’ (p. 18). This can 
be read as either feature (ii) or (iii) or both. But how important is it that people 
have the choice whether or not to achieve bodily health? Do we value the pure 
freedom of choice whether to be healthy? No doubt philosophers’ examples can 
be concocted, but let us think about some real cases. 
 
Consider, for example, men in a district of Glasgow, discussed by Michael 
Marmot and associates, where male life expectancy is 54 (CSDH, 2008, p. 32). 
These are men who all have access to the Scottish health care system, which is 
free at the point of use. Their low life expectancy is largely a result of life-style 
choices: heavy drinking and smoking, injecting drug use, very poor diet, and 
violence. Some men in this district nevertheless avoid these problems, and live to 
a much greater age, suggesting that in some sense all men in the area have the 
freedom to achieve health or to fail to achieve it (this is not to say anything about 
blame or responsibility). Yet despite Nussbaum’s suggestion that we should be 
interested in ‘health capability’ rather than ‘health’ as only the former ‘honors 
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the person’s lifestyle choices’ (p. 26) in this case we do not celebrate the freedom 
of choice of the men who die young, but express concerns about the nature of 
their environment which has led them to make their choices. Freedom whether 
or not to achieve bodily health rarely seems valuable in itself.2 
 
A contrasting example is religious observance, where from a social point of view 
the two different freedoms identified above are the important features, and 
whether people are actually religious is a matter of social indifference. Our view, 
however, is that many of the capabilities under discussion are more like bodily 
health than religious observance, in that much value is in the achievement, and, 
furthermore, part of the good is its being secured. (Mental health and bodily 
integrity are good examples). In this case, the freedom whether or not to achieve 
them is generally not of high value, although it is important that people achieve 
them their own way. 
 
This leads us to think that the important aspect of the capability approach is, in 
general, less about the freedom whether or not to achieve a functioning, but 
rather about being able to take control over the way in which the functioning is 
achieved: to achieve things one’s own way. Nussbaum, of course, recognises the 
importance of achieving  things one’s own way, but at the same time, we think, 
over-emphasises the importance of the freedom not to achieve some 
functionings at all, However, there are of course exceptions as different aspects 
of the human good have different roles in individual lives. 
 
Let us return, then, to the issue of whether we should have used the idea of 
‘fertile capabilities’ rather than ‘fertile functionings’. We have to confess that we 
see some problems in doing so. Apparently there will only be a practical 
difference where a capability is unrealised. But then, how can an unrealised 
capability be fertile? Only, presumably if it can instantly be realised, but then it is 
the functioning that is doing the work. 
 
Take the example of affiliation as a fertile advantage. How might it be so? An 
example comes from work in India where it has been shown that ‘empowering 
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women’s groups’ has beneficial effects for the mental health of new mothers, 
among other significant benefits (Tripathy et al. 2010). How so? Presumably 
because women learn from each other; they are stronger together; they support 
each other in times of need and hardship; and become more confident 
individually. The unrealised capability for affiliation will have none of these 
effects. 
 
Now, the defence of Nussbaum’s critique could be to return to our earlier 
distinctions, and concede that while an unrealised capability will not be fertile, 
there is still a distinction between a realised capability and a (bare) functioning. 
It could be argued that if a functioning is not acquired by these women in their 
own ways, then the beneficial effects will not be forthcoming. Here we can 
concede that it appears women have to ‘own’ the process for themselves for it to 
be effective in generating a beneficial form of affiliation. But is that a way of 
saying that the functioning without ownership is ineffective, or rather that the 
functioning would not actually be acquired without a sense of ownership? 
 
But to make our position clear, we do not believe that an unrealised capability 
can be fertile, unless it can be realised instantly. Where we may agree with 
Nussbaum is that in some cases a functioning can be more or less fertile 
depending on how it is acquired. But even so, we would not wish to apply this to 
every case. Will-power is increasingly regarded as fertile, yet the manner in 
which it is acquired seems to be irrelevant to its effectiveness. Furthermore, as 
we argued above, and this may lead to the confusion, a fertile advantage is, in 
itself, a (perhaps unrealised) capability for other advantages. But this point, we 
think, is most clearly made if we remain with our alliterative usage, and by 
suggesting that a fertile functioning is a functioning in one respect which itself 
contains further capabilities in others. 
 
Last but not least, it seems to us that Nussbaum’s critique reflects a different 
political standpoint to that we would wish to take. Those who are satisfied with a 
situation whereby the state limits itself to offering capabilities – even if these are 
secure capabilities – rather than securing functionings, shift the responsibility for 
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a person’s well being to that person. They claim that it is not the state’s goal to 
see that the horse does drink; it should only see that the horse gets a chance to 
drink from the watering trough. Now, we agree that it is important to expect 
people to take some responsibility for their well being both because often this is 
part of their way to get out of poverty or disadvantage3 and because if all 
disadvantaged people fail to take responsibility this might damage the welfare 
state’s legitimacy. However, if one has in mind the most disadvantaged, those 
who experience a clustering of disadvantages, then, we believe, one should also 
consider how to secure their functionings, not only their capabilities. 
 
Notes
 
1
 Being homeless implies, for example, that one finds it difficult to compete for jobs because 
of the demand by interviewers to supply an address when applying for the job. 
2
In fairness we should note that Nussbaum considers this objection in very abstract form 
(citing Richard Arneson, 2000). She dismisses it on grounds of ‘the high value we assign to 
choice’ (p. 26). We believe it is possible to respect choice – choice in the way that people 
achieve good health – without giving high value to the choice whether or not to become 
healthy. To be clear, we accept that it is legitimate for people to make choices that may 
damage their health, but this is as a side-effect of other activity that they find valuable, rather 
than a freedom that is good in itself.  
3
 Homeless people are often encouraged to take responsibility not only to themselves but also 
to other creatures, namely dogs. The idea behind this policy is that because they have become 
homeless they don’t practice any responsibility; they need not clean and maintain their home, 
cook for themselves or others, pay bills, and so on; so taking responsibility for the dog is a 
first step towards becoming accustomed again to practicing responsibilities. 
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